Egypt"s new mysteries

Until now, Egypt"s unsolved mysteries were just the real period when the Sphinx was built and whether his face was that of Khufu, Khafre or some other character, remodeled once to praise one of the kings who erected the great pyramids of Giza.

Well, politics has now added another one: "the Egyptian revolution". They haven"t chose the flower or the color to name it after, but it has been labeled a revolution, as soon as the violent protests against the Mubarak became serious enough to warrant extended live feeds by the BBC or CNN. However, neither the "live broadcasts", nor the ambiguous statements by the leaders of the world"s powers do enough to explain what"s happening. So, what is happening?

The answer would be easy: there is a search for "an alternative to Mubarak". Like most "growth dictatorships" of the 20th century, the regime in Egypt has at the top of the power pyramid a "patriarch", who is considered the guarantee of the continuation of the country"s modernization process, which was begun by "the great founder", in this case Anwar el Saadat, the irreplaceable pillar of the country"s stability (in other words, the one strong enough to keep the Army and the Intelligence Services in check) and an essential partner to the geo-political players involved in the great "confrontation for peace" in the Middle East. This is the standard portrait of Khosni Mubarak, in his more than 30 years that he has led Egypt.

Regimes of this nature have the advantage of stability, and, like in the case of Egypt, a reasonable degree of success when it comes to development. For a population of about 80 million inhabitants, in 2010, Egypt had a GDP of about 500 billion dollars, which has been growing for the last 10 years, generated by an investment rate which has exceeded 15% of the GDP a year. The about 26 million of Egyptians, which may up the active workforce, are employed mostly in services, which accounts for about 48% of the GDP, in industry, which accounts for 38% of the GDP, and in agriculture, which generates about 13% of the GDP. This formula inevitably leads to a social structure typical to "growth dictatorships": a society with stark social contrasts, with one fifth of the population below the official poverty line, which barely accounts for 4% of consumption, with riches concentrated in the hands of about 10% of the population, which in turn covered about 27% of the country"s consumption, and with a middle class made up of the intellectuals working in office jobs, education and crafts, which is becoming increasingly numerous, capable of supporting the long term growth of the country.

The bad thing about "growth dictatorships", from a political point of view, is that, as time goes by, they become extremely oppressive and their leaders become afflicted by the "illusion of immortality". As a result, replacing the regime becomes an event that is considered impossible, and passing the mantle is only done in extreme cases, and when it happens, it usually goes to the heir of the leader. This insularism also represents the biggest weakness of this type of political regimes. This is the Achilles heel which is exploited by everyone these days, who, on the streets of Cairo, in the "laboratories of power" or in specially created bunkers, are looking for a solution for Egypt"s post-Mubarak era. This scenario ends, even though it does so in social convulsions that may extend over time, with a regime that"s labeled democratic in the first two years and which naturally becomes a new dictatorship in the next 10-15 years that it stays in office.

The second scenario however, is a lot gloomier. Anyone who is watching the protests in Cairo these days can"t help but make comparisons to the beginning of the "Islamic revolution" in Iran, which was also sparked by the collapse of a lengthy "growth dictatorship" of Reza Pahlevi. All we are missing from the picture is the Ayatollah coming in by plane from his "exile" to take over the "spiritual" leadership of the Revolution. Since such events generate several scenarios that run simultaneously, each of them "drafted" by a different force and guided by differing interests, for now, the stand-in for the "Ayatollah" is a layman, namely Mohamad El Baradei. The man who made a name for himself as the chairman of an international organization, AIEA, which was by definition apolitical, but which was manipulated by Baradei so as to reach its goal as fast and as quickly as possible. His plan was a success, the man even got the Nobel Peace Prize, after helping Russia"s policy, by helping Iran avoid the most drastic measures of the international community and to develop its illegal nuclear program, while at the same time making sure to make available "to those whom it may concern", of the other side, all the details that could have helped a preemptive strike by Israel against Iran"s nuclear capacities. Beyond the lust for power of Baradei or of others, who are looking with hungry eyes at the privileges that Mubarak is enjoying, the events of Cairo can easily turn into an Islamic revolution, even though it may be just a "lite" version of the one in Iran. It is what Israeli officials have been saying openly over the past few days, for the benefit of the European and American politicians, who were rather enthusiastic about the impulse that the "revolutionary democracy" of the Middle East received.

The only authentic mystery is who will win the game: the Islamic forces, or a new "non-religious solution". At any rate, Israel is already in a situation for which it is not at all ready, where Egypt, which until now was the only Arab country it had as partner for peace, becoming a potential and very influential adversary, if not an enemy outright. The spiral of time seems to have brought us back to the Zero Hour, but appearances can be deceiving. The Arab world is on the offensive today, in its long running battle with Israel, unlike in the 1948-1967 period, and the Western world is far less committed to support Israel.