In case of conflict, we wait in vain for 100.000 soldiers from the West

The European Union is currently unable to strengthen its common defence because military mobility is blocked by administrative bureaucracy and chronic underfunding, according to a report published last night by the European Court of Auditors (ECA) covering the period 2021-2024.

Marek Opiola, the Member of the Court responsible for the report, said: "Military mobility is essential if we want the EU to have a credible defence capability. The need to accelerate it is becoming clear. The problem is that it has not progressed at a rapid pace, due to bottlenecks."

From the analysis of the ECA report, we note that European military mobility at this time - the one that should transfer almost 100,000 soldiers and the related combat equipment from Western to Eastern Europe in a few days, in the event of a conflict with Russia - is characterized by two aspects: little money and lack of vision. The fact that the European Union has allocated only 1.7 billion euros for military mobility in the period 2021-2027 is simply ridiculous, if we take into account, according to the ECA report, the fact that EU member states spent almost 280 billion euros on defense in 2023 and 240 billion euros in 2022. Basically, this tiny amount intended for mobility demonstrates that the mobility of troops and equipment has not been a real priority for decision-makers in Brussels, who have been waving the threat of a European conflict from the Russian Federation for several years.

Moreover, the allocated funds have been rapidly exhausted, leaving the EU in a state of stagnation and zero financial predictability for the next four years. In effect, military mobility will remain blocked until at least 2027, at a time when Europe should be more prepared than ever for war scenarios. This modest amount reflects not only a lack of funds, but also a structural inability to anticipate the real needs of European defense. A budget allocation of 1.7 billion euros for a crucial strategic project denotes a bureaucratic approach, in which the EU prefers to "tick boxes" instead of building a solid strategy.

However, some of the beneficiary states of the 29 actions included in the EU military mobility plan have started to refocus and access funding for some projects from the Connecting Europe Facility, which is financed with euro25.81 billion for the period 2021-2027, but even these funds are insufficient for the motorway networks, railway networks, bridges and viaducts that need to be built or modernised. Moreover, not all of the amount from this mechanism can be accessed by dual-use projects - civil and military, which is another obstacle to financing military mobility projects. One of the most serious findings of the report is that military infrastructure projects have been chosen "one by one, in a fragmented way, without taking into account the bigger picture". This is a clear recognition that the EU does not have a coherent and coordinated strategy for military mobility. The lack of a global vision is evident in the way the funds were distributed: the emphasis was on the EU's east (Poland and the Baltics), while the southern route to Ukraine (Greece-Bulgaria-Romania-Ukraine) was almost completely ignored. Furthermore, the selection of projects was made before the most pressing priorities were established. In other words, the EU distributed the money before it knew exactly what it needed to finance. This approach is not only wrong, but dangerous, as allocating funds without a rigorous strategic analysis can have disastrous effects on the EU's real capacity to react quickly in the event of a major crisis.

• Suffocating bureaucracy, slow reactions

The problem of military mobility is not only a financial one, but also a bureaucratic one. Currently, an EU country must send a notification 45 days in advance to obtain authorizations for the cross-border movement of military equipment. Moreover, for various reasons, such as administrative formalities, there can be significant delays in organising military movements. For example, tanks from one EU country cannot pass through another Member State if their weight exceeds the limit allowed by road traffic regulations. In an era where modern warfare is characterised by speed of reaction and instant mobilisation, this absurd bureaucracy is turning the European Union into a paper fortress, unable to adapt in real time to emerging threats.

Worse still, the ECA auditors claim that, despite the urgent need to modernise military mobility, Brussels did not carry out a detailed assessment of the real needs before drawing up the Action Plan 2.0. Thus, the European Commission has not set targets without a clear estimate of the funding needed to achieve them. This managerial incompetence turns the EU's ambitions into a mere exercise in image.

The report also highlights another alarming aspect: the "lack of a single point of contact" makes it difficult to clearly understand responsibilities regarding military mobility in the EU. In a geopolitical context in which NATO and the EU must work together more closely than ever, this fragmentation of responsibilities significantly reduces the effectiveness of any action taken in Brussels.

Instead of having a clear coordination mechanism, the EU is caught in a complex web of governance, in which it is not clear "who does what". This administrative chaos turns military mobility from a strategic objective into a bureaucratic exercise lacking tangible results.

• ECA recommendations: What needs to change immediately

At the end of the report, the ECA auditors propose several recommendations aimed at facilitating the implementation of the 29 actions established at EU level. These recommendations concern:

- Significantly increasing funding. euro1.7 billion for six years is a ridiculously small amount. That is why the auditors believe that a budget at least five times larger is needed to ensure real mobility.

- Eliminating absurd bureaucracy. The 45-day notification periods for troop movements must be drastically reduced. The EU must implement a rapid approval mechanism.

- Unified strategic planning. Chaotic funding without clear priorities can no longer be allowed. Every euro must be allocated on the basis of a coherent military vision.

- Creating a single command centre. The EU urgently needs a structure to coordinate military mobility, to avoid the current fragmentation and inefficiency.

- Integrating military mobility into existing civilian infrastructure. The EU must capitalise on civilian transport infrastructure to enable the rapid movement of military equipment, without unnecessary logistical bottlenecks.

The European Court of Auditors' report unequivocally demonstrates that EU military mobility is currently largely a myth. With insufficient funds, a fragmented strategy, excessive bureaucracy and the lack of an effective coordination centre, Brussels has not only failed to achieve its objectives, but has also sabotaged its own ability to react at a crucial moment. While the world is changing rapidly and threats to European security are increasing, the EU remains stuck in ineffective approaches, managed by a bureaucracy incapable of taking quick and coherent decisions. If this trend is not urgently reversed, European military mobility will remain a theoretical concept, and the continent's security will continue to be at the mercy of circumstances and external interventions.