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The Romanian presidential elections were marked by a tense climate, amplified by recent revelations about the involvement of state and non-state actors in the electoral process. The CSAT documents indicate a direct intervention by the Russian Federation, along with domestic networks of influence, which exploited the vulnerabilities of the electoral infrastructure and the online environment to promote a candidate with pro-Russian sympathies.
One of the most shocking aspects of the revelations refers to the undeclared funding in support of Călin Georgescu. According to the SRI, the TikTok user "bogpr" made donations of over one million euros to promote the candidate. Of these amounts:
- $381,000 was directed to influencers to promote pro-candidate content between October 24 and November 24, 2024.
- Other amounts were used for actions to manipulate the platform's algorithms, increasing the visibility of the materials.
Although Georgescu declared a campaign budget of "zero lei" to the Permanent Electoral Authority (AEP), the documents show that the financing was carried out through methods that circumvent electoral legislation:
- FameUp, a platform for monetizing online activities, was used to recruit Romanian influencers.
- South African firm FA Agency offered influencers 1,000 euros for distributing a pro-candidate video.
Moreover, the coordination of the actions involved suspicious companies and individuals in the cryptocurrency sector, including DIGITAL ON-RAMP SOLUTIONS SRL and BITXATM TECHNOLOGY SRL, led by Gabriel Prodanescu, a South African citizen with ties to Russia.
• Media manipulation: TikTok and Telegram, the main weapons
According to information sent by the SRI and the Ministry of Interior to the CSAT, Călin Georgescu's promotion campaign was massively supported through the TikTok platform:
- 76 new accounts were created exclusively for promoting the candidate after the launch of the Telegram channel @propagatorcg.
- Over 1,183 accounts used the hashtag "#CG11" to amplify pro-candidate messages.
- The network was supported by local and regional influencers, as well as accounts affiliated with the Sputnik publication.
The activity of the accounts was well organized, with users trained through Telegram and Discord channels to distribute coordinated content. This included comments, videos, and the use of algorithmic symbols to manipulate visibility on the platform. The MIA documents also show that support for Călin Georgescu came not only from external influences, but also from internal extremist and underworld networks:
- Leaders of criminal groups actively financed and promoted the campaign on TikTok, with payments of hundreds of thousands of euros per day for promoting Călin Georgescu's messages
- Neo-legionnaire and ultra-orthodox groups used their own channels to disseminate pro-Georgescu messages
- The tactics used are reminiscent of the Russian "Balance and Verticality" campaign in Ukraine, with the aim of destabilizing social cohesion.
• Cyberattacks: Vulnerability of electoral infrastructure
From the STS information included in the declassified documents, we note that the Permanent Electoral Authority faced a series of unprecedented cyberattacks on IT&C systems. Thus, the server gis.registrulelectoral.ro, connected to both the internet and the internal network, was compromised on November 19, 2024. The cyberattacks came from 33 countries and aimed to exploit vulnerabilities, alter public data and block the infrastructure. According to the SRI, these attacks continued even on election day and the night after the election. The methods used included advanced anonymization and distributed networks of attackers (botnets), making direct attribution difficult.
• Reactions of the political class
Elena Lasconi, the USR candidate in the presidential elections, denounced the methods of influence used and drew attention to the threat to democracy: "So that everyone understands: this was Russia's working method before entering the territory of Ukraine with troops. And here I think we should ask ourselves a big question mark. This was exactly Russia's working method. It's good that it was declassified.
It could have happened a little earlier, maybe even earlier than the first round, because I don't think they only found out now. I know that there were a lot of moderators, most of them from Europe, who were acting in the Romanian area during the electoral campaign. And practically this whole avalanche of messages on TikTok by Mr. Georgescu intensified massively two weeks ago and I understand that it cost a million euros, not zero lei, as he was saying until now", said Elena Lasconi.
In contrast, Călin Georgescu stated that the declassification of the documents of the Supreme Council of National Defense (CSAT) is "a massive desperation of the system".
Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu, re-elected PSD president, claimed that he was the most affected in the presidential race by the artificial increase in Georgescu's exposure, exposure that circumvented the legal framework and led to Ciolacu's failure to enter the second round of the presidential elections, and announced that, under the current conditions, he supports Elena Lasconi's candidacy in the second round and Romania's pro-European path.
Ana Birchall, who ran for president on November 24, said that "the documents declassified by the CSAT show critical aspects that include serious security breaches that undermine Romania's sovereignty and that, obviously, call into question the fairness of the presidential elections, including in the first round, being fundamentally flawed."
Another candidate in the first round, Cristian Diaconescu, former foreign minister, said that, "given that former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg mentioned that in the event of a cyber attack against a NATO state, the activation of Article 5 is not excluded", the situation in Romania should be followed by a quick decision by the allies.
Cristian Diaconescu concluded: "In this case, there is no longer room for subjective interpretations or for discussions about political sympathies or trust in parties. This reality directly contradicts the fundamental principles of democracy and undermines the sovereignty of the state. In this exceptional context, if the electoral process continues: Lasconi is the only valid option".
Former judge Cristian Dănileţ stated on his official Facebook page that the acts that would fall under the actions of Călin Georgescu or those around him can be criminally classified as treason or attempted treason. Cristian Dănileţ pointed out: "If it is proven that someone has contacted a foreign state or group to help them take power in Romania and use it to our detriment by removing business people, dissolving political parties, undermining the army and military allies, I say that he can be investigated and tried for treason, provided for by art. 394 of the Criminal Code. Even if he makes preparations and his actions fail, he can be investigated and tried for attempted treason, provided for by art. 412 of the Criminal Code. (...) Within a maximum of 48 hours we will have to have a large-scale judicial action, which will be carried out by the elite unit called DIICOT." The United States reacted promptly to the revelations, expressing concerns about Russia's involvement in the destabilization of a NATO ally. In an official statement, the State Department stressed the need to ensure the integrity of the electoral process in our country and the importance of continuing transatlantic cooperation between the US and Romania.
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