Ukraine - for now, a conflict without a solution

An "athletic" diplomatic effort in Minsk, heavily covered in the media, has ended inconclusively, with a cautious assessment, despite the efforts of the political protagonists to "inject" the feeling that the result is significant. Upon a realistic assessment, it was a failure.

The "Norman" format (a moniker which was probably supposed to provide France a platonic satisfaction) of the negotiations was that of the "summit" talks between Russia and Ukraine, in the presence of de facto mediators Germany and France, which were represented at the highest level, while the talks were hosted by the president of Belarus.

This is the second formal attempt with international participation, dedicated to resolving the conflict, after the one of September 2014.

The concrete result is a cease-fire agreement, on February 15th, and the withdrawal of the heavy weapons of the Ukrainian forces and of the separatists behind the lines of a buffer area placed between the combatants. The document signed is the one concerning "the complex of measures for the implementation of last year's agreements of Minsk" (translation from Russian).

Flimsy... Perhaps that is all that was possible.

The Ukrainian "knot" has become increasingly tangled. The honest efforts of the negotiators have failed because of the acute divide between the interests of all the participants.

Ukraine wants the restoration of its borders (to its maximal form, the one that it had before Crimea was taken over).

As for Russia - the Crimean issue is completely closed. The longer the negotiations last, the more the others come to the realization that the "status quo ante" is a pipe dream. What matters to Russia now, is for the separatists to be accepted in the negotiations as partners and, based on that, for Eastern Ukraine to become autonomous, with possibilities of political and economic development going as far as separation, which would be internationally recognized.

Germany - it wants the negotiated ending of the strategic and economic conflict. Its interests are better served if Russia is content, than by an escalation of the conflict. In this situation, Germany will no longer have any major lever allowing it to influence the outcome. That is why it has taken the risk of urging for negotiations and has endorsed them on principle, through its attendance.

France - which attended the negotiations for economic reasons (it will be able to deliver to Russia its Mistral ships in the event a solution to the Ukrainian issue is found). Furthermore, since it claims to share the leadership when it comes to European issues, handing over the top position to Germany doesn't sit well with it. In the end, if a stable and generally accepted solutions is achieved, it doesn't make any difference to Germany whether it achieved on its own or as part of a duo.

If the negotiation does fail, it is better to have more players involved among whom to spread the blame.

The US - which is taking a "wait-and-see" stance, is giving the negotiations a chance, while at the same time keeping its main position unchanged. Hence, the statement that it made immediately after the negotiations mentions "Ukraine's sovereignty" and that Russia "should stop the support it is providing to the separatists and withdraw its soldiers and military equipment in Eastern Ukraine".

Highly unlikely!

The elements in question don't even figure in the common positions expressed in Minsk. Thus, the American statement pressures Germany and France through its subtext- the US reserves the right to make a decision when it comes to supplying defensive weapons to Ukraine.

For now, Russia is the winner of the current round.

The "agreement" in Minsk - in my opinion, the word "agreement" mystifies the truth - cements a "status quo" that favors Russia and the separatists. Besides, the Russian president has actually emphasized that fact in his statement that followed the marathon negotiation session: "...unfortunately, the authorities in Kyiv are refusing direct contacts with the representatives of the people's republics of Donetsk and Lugansk". Whereas, if one wants long term solutions, "they have to start from the real life ... and then, direct contacts are necessary".

In this context, the participants' agreement that Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity must be honored sounds weird and unconvincing! It is understandable that Mr. Poroshenko insists on this principle and states that there federalization is not an issue being discussed. But, in contradiction with that stance, the very text of the agreement sets so many conditions that Ukraine must meet that one can wonder: what sovereignty, what independence, what integrity?

The very definition of the buffer area is telling.

In Minsk, in September 2014, there was talk about a demilitarized zone along the Russian-Ukrainian border. Now, there is no more talk about it, save indirectly at best. However, emphasis is being placed on the buffer area, but it remains to be seen what its location will be.

The text of the "complex of measures" marks a historic achievement for the separatists, for Russia. The text is available for review and I won't dwell much on it. But there are elements whose significance can difficultly be ignored.

Thus:

- Resuming control of the national border by the Ukrainian authorities across the entire conflict area will only be possible after the local elections in departments and after the political system enters normalcy towards the end of 2015, subject to honoring the provisions of item 11, after the consultations with the representatives of the other districts of Donetsk and Lugansk (our note: meaning, with the separatists) as part of the trilateral contact group.

- The condition of conducting a constitutional reform. A new Constitution must be passed at the end of 2015 - the key element of decentralization, while honoring the specifics of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, which has been negotiated with their representatives, as well as a legislation of the special status of certain districts of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, in compliance with the measures indicated in the footnotes.

I will leave aside the uncertainty of the passing of the Constitution and the legislation of the special state mentioned above - the positions expressed in the Kyiv Rada are so diametrically opposite, the spectrum of political forces is so wide, that the agreement in Minsk may be hard, perhaps even impossible to achieve from the very beginning.

It is obvious why the Minsk agreement marks a strong political progress of the separatists, of Russia. Which will cause serious problems to countries bordering the area and to those in the West. Which will eventually have to choose between remaining unyielding towards Russia or "accommodating" it.

Unpleasant, dangerous if the worst comes to the worst, but... it wouldn't be the first time ...

It is obvious that there is the risk of the conflict spreading in the following months. And this scenario is being reviewed by all those concerned. Far too few of them would really want that to happen. But in order to avoid escalation, the loss of control of the situation, there must be a credible factor that can discourage the escalation, somebody has to lose, to be sacrificed. Both scenarios are perfectly possible and as time goes by and the issue isn't resolved, they become more likely. Both scenarios raise extremely serious issues for Romania.

The escalation can be avoided. It's just that, for the sake of many, one will suffer. Cynically speaking, based on the sad prior experiences, one possible development would be for the mediation to be replaced by arbitrage.

Or to piously hope that the main players will understand the truth of the "you know how you start a war, but you never know how you will end it" adage, and thus will exercise moderation.