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The presidential elections of November 24, 2024 produced not only an unexpected result - with an outsider, Călin Georgescu, placed first with over 2.2 million votes - but also a lingering, silent and pressing question: were the votes counted correctly? The lack of civic reaction from the "Georgescu electorate", despite the spectacular score, raises questions about its existence. Its absence from the streets, from protests or from the general physical space, contrasts sharply with the displayed result.
Where are the 2.2 million people who voted for Călin Georgescu on November 24?
In this article, we sought to see if the voters in question were actually present throughout the electoral process, but what we found was an unsettling reality: the state institutions that manage electoral IT systems - the Special Telecommunications Service and the Permanent Electoral Authority - treat with opacity the very questions to which they should have the most transparent answers. And opacity or silence is often more eloquent than any official speech.
• Official answers without verifiable content
The article published by BURSA on March 12, 2025 - "Occam's Razor: Georgescu's Two Million Voters May Not Exist" - stated an uncomfortable hypothesis: if no one saw these voters, perhaps the votes were digitally fabricated. Not as an accusation, but as a legitimate question. Unfortunately, this question did not receive any concrete answer from the authorities.
The BURSA newspaper has addressed in writing, based on Law 544/2001, questions to the Special Telecommunications Service (STS) and the Permanent Electoral Authority (AEP) regarding the identity of the developers of the electoral information system, the existence of independent audits and the publication of the results of these audits, if they exist.
In the letters sent to STS and AEP, we raised the following questions:
"1. Which company or consortium of companies provided or
developed the software used for the aggregation, centralization and transmission of electoral results in the 2024 presidential elections and for the processing of the minutes in the IT platform operated by STS?
2. What are the contracts concluded by STS with the respective suppliers?
We would like you to provide us with a copy of these contracts, indicating the supplier, the value of the contract, its duration and its object.
3. Were there external, independent or internal audits regarding the operation of this software during the election period? If so, we request that you provide us with copies of the audit reports or their conclusions.
4. Why is the identity of the software supplier not communicated transparently in the public space, given the importance of this system in the conduct of the elections?".
Regarding the above questions, the Special Telecommunications Service sent us, through the Press Office, the following response:
"Following your request registered internally with no. 100559 of 27.03.2025, we inform you that the Special Telecommunications Service (STS) supports correct and transparent information on all aspects related to the technical support provided by our institution in the organization of electoral processes.
In this regard, information regarding the role, duties and secure IT&C services made available to the Permanent Electoral Authority (AEP) are published online at https://sts.ro/ro/alegeri/rol-si-atributii/.
Thus, we reiterate that AEP and STS ensure, in accordance with legal provisions, the implementation and management of the information systems necessary for the smooth conduct of the electoral process, as follows:
- The information system for monitoring voter turnout and preventing illegal voting (SIMPV);
- The information application for verifying the right to vote (ADV);
- The IT system for centralizing the minutes (SICPV).
The IT systems were developed entirely internally by STS specialists, in accordance with the operational requirements of the AEP, the decisions of the Central Electoral Bureau and the electoral legislation. We also specify that STS ensures the functioning of the IT systems, their maintenance and equipment, as well as technical assistance, 24 hours a day.
Also, during the electoral processes, the specialists of our institution provide assistance, through the Technical Support Center, to the staff of the polling stations for the use of the equipment and the ADV application".
Since in the above response, STS omitted to answer our question regarding the internal audit and external audit after last year's presidential elections, we sent a new request to this service, and the response received was:
"Following your request, registered internally with no. 100597 of 01.04.2025, we inform you that the Special Telecommunications Service provides technical support for the Permanent Electoral Authority (AEP) in order to organize and conduct electoral processes, according to specific legislation. The IT systems are developed according to the operational requirements of the AEP, and after testing and approval in terms of compliance, they are handed over to the AEP. At the same time, we inform you that the IT terminals, communication resources, systems and specific applications made available to the AEP, on the occasion of the elections organized on November 24, 2024, were constantly evaluated by STS specialists from the perspective of cybersecurity before, during and after the conclusion of the electoral processes.
For its part, in a terse response, the Permanent Electoral Authority stated that the applications were "certified" and sent us to read the legislation in force, without specifying whether there was any external, independent or transparent audit.
• The polling stations cannot support massive fraud
Journalistic analysis shows that a fraud of this magnitude (e.g. 2 million modified votes) could not go undetected due to several aspects: the minutes are signed in the polling stations and transmitted to the parties; the parties conduct parallel counts; a huge discrepancy between the minutes and the official results would be immediately discovered.
Therefore, massive fraud in polling stations is impossible without broad complicity. However, in 19,000 polling stations, such a thing cannot be hidden.
And yet, a vulnerable area remains: the digital centralization of votes, in software developed by STS, without public audit. Several aspects may arise in this regard, such as fine redistributions of votes, impossible to detect at the polling station level, algorithmic manipulations during aggregation and changes in scores without physical traces. Therefore, in the absence of an external audit and the publication of the source code, no one can guarantee that these risks have not materialized.
• Voting - an act of faith?
Technology brings speed and efficiency. But in the absence of civic control and external audit, it can become the perfect tool for invisible manipulation. Voting must be more than a gesture of participation. It must be verifiable.
At this point, voting in Romania is an act of faith, not certainty.
In conclusion, democracy must not only be practiced. It must be defended.
BURSA does not accuse.
BURSA asks.
And it will continue to ask until STS publishes who developed the digital electoral system, AEP publishes external audits, if they exist, and the software that decides the fate of the vote becomes transparent, audited, verifiable.
Until then, elections remain what a democratic regime cannot afford: non-transparent. And a democracy that demands trust but does not provide verification is no longer democracy, but only a sham.
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